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Abstract: This paper seeks to analyze the moderate 
ideology of Muhammadiyah dan NU, popularly known as 
the champion of Indonesia’s moderate Islam. Questions to 
be investigated are: to what extent that NU and Muhamma-
diyah theologically represent moderatism? Is there any such 
thing as “moderate Islam” in Indonesia? How can a blue-
print of moderate Islam be formulated in the context of 
Indonesian Islam? The underpinning theoretical assump-
tion upon which this paper is based is that the theological 
formulation of Islamic moderatism developed by NU and 
Muhammadiyah can no longer accommodate the latest 
challenges and demands of the era. In the context of Indo-
nesian Islam, therefore, a representative formulation of 
how moderate Islam can be constructed is badly needed. 
What NU and Muhammadiyah have demonstrated so far in 
the landscape of Indonesian Islam, nevertheless, can serve 
as a stepping stone towards building a more liable formula-
tion of an Indonesian Islam in the future.  
Keywords: Islamic moderatism, Muhammadiyah, Nahdla-
tul Ulama (NU), radical Islamism. 
Introduction 
At the 33rd annual conference held by the Association of Muslim 
Social Scientists (AMSS) on September 24-26, 2004 at George Mason 
University Law School in Arlington, Virginia, US, with the theme: 
“Revisioning Modernity: Challenges and Possibilities for Islam”, some 
                                                                
1 The earlier draft was delivered at the International Seminar on Islamic Studies held 
by the Director Forum of Postgraduate Programs of Indonesia’s Islamic Higher 
Education at STAIN Jember, 20-21 April 2012. 
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papers were delivered to criticize and reformulate what and who 
moderate Muslim is. One of the papers was entitled: “Moderate Islam, 
Progressive Muslims, Democracy, and Post-Islamism”,2 underlining 
that “moderate” Muslims are those who disagree with the use of 
violence in their ideology and strategy. In the context of the US and 
the West in general, the concept and praxis of Islamic moderatism may 
be different from the same concept held by Indonesian Muslims. In 
the US, the concept of moderatism gives more emphasis on religious 
mentality and mindset which is self-critical and reflective, pro-
democracy and human rights, as well as supportive of secularism as an 
ideology. The last characteristic of moderatism is undoubtedly 
problematic if it is viewed in the context of Indonesian Islam.  
This paper tries to unravel the “myth” of Indonesia’s moderate 
Islam by analyzing two mainstream religious organizations which have 
enjoyed their reputation as the champion of moderate Islam: Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The questions that are going to be 
developed throughout are: is it the case that the religious worldviews 
of the two organizations are moderate in nature? Is there any such 
thing as typically Indonesian moderate Islam? And, how to construct a 
viable and workable blue-print of Indonesia’s moderate Islam?  
In responding tothe above questions, this paper is divided into 
three parts as follows: (1) discussing the conceptual hurdles of Islamic 
moderatism; (2) examining the extent to which Muhammadiyah and 
NU can be classified as “moderate” organizations in the landscape of 
Indonesian Islam, and; (3) proposing a more established blue-print of 
moderate vision of Indonesian Islam.  
Conceptual Hurdles  
It must be admitted from the outset that the word “moderate” and 
“moderatism” represents a conceptual nomenclature which is not easy 
to define. This is partly because its meaning is highly contested among 
different religious groups and scholars, contingent upon who and 
where it is defined.3 Instead of giving a clear and distinct conceptual 
                                                                
2 Kamran A. Bokhari, “Moderate Islam, Progressive Muslims, Democracy, and Post-
Islamism”, paper delivered at the 33rd Annual Conference of the Association of 
Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), 24-26 September 2004 at George Mason University 
Law School, Arlington, Virginia, US. 
3 John L. Esposito, “Moderate Muslims: A Mainstream of Modernists, Islamists, 
Conservatives, and Traditionalists,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, 
No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 12. 
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boundary, the concept of moderatism serves as a hurdle that appeals 
public debate among Muslims. As a result, while some feel comfort-
able with the use and attribution of the word, some others do notand 
even show a strong objection to it as the paper shall demonstrate later. 
 It is a matter of fact , that the term “moderatism” is not well-
acknowledged in the discourse of classical Islamic thought. Its 
connotation, however, refers to the use of several Arabic words such 
as al-wasat} or tawassut} (moderation), al-qist} (justice), al-tawa>zun (fairness), 
al-i‘tida>l (harmony), tasa>muh} (tolerance). Those words are employed by 
Muslims to mean a non-violent mode of religiosity in the Islamic 
tradition. Since the word “moderatism” is understood subjectively by 
many, it always invites controversies and subjective biases. More 
importantly, it has never been neutral from the intervention of political 
and economic interests. As a result, this semantic hurdle results in the 
difficulty in arriving at a conclusive meaning of what the word 
“moderate” refers to and who moderate Muslims comprise of. 
Based on the explanation above, it is fairly understandable that the 
question of who moderate Muslims are is not easy to answer. If one 
refers to the definition of the word “moderate” as provided in an 
English dictionary, it is found that the term means: 1) average in 
amount, intensity, quality, etc; not extreme; 2) of or having (political) 
opinions that are not extreme; 3) keeping or kept within limits that are 
not excessive.4 
Within the landscape of Islamic thought and practices, the degree 
of moderatism is understood differently according to different people, 
contexts and localities. Despite the fact that the concept of 
moderatismis generally more-or-less similar in meaning, it is a highly 
contested concept. In general, it means a middle-path, a choice 
between the two extreme poles of religious thought. In the tradition of 
religious thought, those two extreme poles are usually described as al-
ghuluww –Yusuf al-Qardhawi names it as al-mutat}arrif—and the concept 
of moderatism usually refers to al-wasat} or tawassut}, whose meaning is 
middle-path, middle-way or middle-ground.5  
It is within the above context that a numerous definitions of 
moderatism can be found. The concept of moderatism in a Muslim 
                                                                
4 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 798. 
5 Al-Wast } is translated by Hans Wehr as middle-path. See, Hans Wehr, Modern Written 
Arabic (Gӧttingen: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1979), p. 1248. 
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majority country such as Indonesia may take different shape from the 
same concept in a minority-Muslim country such as the US and other 
Western countries. In Indonesia, the concept of moderatism is used to 
indicate a particular religious thought or practice that adopts neither 
two poles of Islamic thought; the typically-Western liberal thought and 
radical Islamism thought. Outside of the two poles lies the bulk 
majority of Muslims where everybody would be happily identified as 
moderate Muslims. 
The middle-path mode of religiosity, nevertheless, has been 
criticized as having an ambiguous position where an authentic religious 
standing and identity is at stake. This ambiguous position is equivalent 
to the position of “neither-nor” (la-wa-la, Ar.), a term that points to 
“no-where” position: neither West nor East, neither right extreme nor 
left one, neither literalist nor liberalist, and so forth. This ambiguous 
standing can be interpreted as the absence of theological conviction in 
one’s religious mind and heart. Due to this reason, some rejects this 
term on the ground of ambiguity in meaning. A trivial question is; if 
conceptually speaking the concept of Islamic moderatism refers to 
neither West nor East, neither liberal nor literal, how can the real 
picture of Islamic moderatism take shape? 
The rejection of some to this term is also based on the argument 
that moderate Islam does not reflect the whole-heartedness in religion 
(ka>ffah)6. On the contrary, they assume that moderatism reflects half-
heartedness in observing Islamic tenets. They further maintain that 
moderate Islam is a kind of downgraded or reduced version of Islam 
from the presumably authentic Islam. In their opinion, moderate Islam 
does not reflect an authentic Islam. Simply put, it represents less Islam. 
This type of group usually rejects any type of adjective to be attributed 
to this religion, such as radical, liberal or even moderate. Such an 
attribution is regarded as allowing Islam to lapse into a fragmented 
entity. They argue against this position by maintaining that Islam 
comprises only one entity; neither liberal nor literal, neither liberal nor 
radical, neither extreme nor moderate.7  
Another argument rejecting the use of moderatism is that this 
word is typically Western founded. In other words, it was invented by 
                                                                
6 M.A. Muqtedar Khan, “Islamic Democracy and Moderate Muslims: The Straight 
Path Runs through the Middle,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(Summer 2005), p. 40. 
7 Ibid. 
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the West without intended consequences. In their mind, in inventing 
this concept, the West may want to undermine the strength and 
solidity of Muslims by injecting whatever terms and words that are 
considered theologically inauthentic and are, therefore, not in line with 
the spirit of Islam. Such a rejection reminds us to the same rejection 
among the Islamists to other concepts which are construed as not 
authentically Islamic simply because they do not find any word in 
Arabic that is equivalent in meaning to those terms such as democracy, 
human rights, pluralism and multiculturalism, and the like.8 In their 
view, all of these words do not have any sound and strong basis in the 
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th, the most pristine sources in Islam. 
Regardless the above controversy, the concept of moderatism in 
the context of Indonesian Islam has at least the following 
characteristics; 1) non-violent ideology in propagating Islam; 2) 
adopting the modern way of life with its all derivatives, including 
science and technology, democracy, human rights and the like; 3) the 
use of rational way of thinking; 4) contextual approach in 
understanding Islam, and; 5) the use of ijtiha>d (intellectual exercises to 
make a legal opinion in case of the absence of explicit justification 
from the Qur’a>n and H {adi>th). Those characteristics are, however, can 
be expanded into several more characteristics such as tolerance, 
harmony and cooperation among different religious groups. 
In the context of the US, however, moderatism sometimes 
contains ideological-political-economical biases which are in line with 
the contemporary condition of the country. The meaning of 
moderatism is understood from the context of post-September 11 
tragedy that destroyed the World Trade Center, the economic icon of 
the US. The attack of al-Qaeda to the center of civilization and power 
of the US has been considered as the turning point from where a 
paradigm shift in understanding the concept of moderatism occurred. 
Prior to September 11, the concept of moderatism was understood as 
a non-violent religious variant. After that tragedy, however, the 
concept has been twisted too far as a result of the contestation of 
religious ideologies to identify the demarcation lines which 
differentiate those who side with the West from those who stand for 
those Islamists. 
                                                                
8 Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2010), pp. 165-169. 
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It is within the ideological contestation that the concept of 
moderatism is understood in an overlapping manner as those who 
support democracy, human rights, secularism, the US policy of war on 
terror, and the like. In the US press, the moderate Muslims are 
identified as those who side with the West in political vision or those 
who are self-critical in their religious thought.9 Meanwhile, the term 
moderate Islam is pejoratively deployed as those whose religious vision 
is secular and normatively “less Islam.” In the US, moderate Muslims 
are those who adopt the soft version of Islam—such as the John 
Esposito’s, Irshad Manji’s and Karen Armstrong’s version of Islam—
who wish to coexist and live together with the non-Muslims and feel 
convenient with typically Western values such as liberal democracy and 
the ideology of separation of religion and the state.10 
The context of global politics is also another determinant aspect in 
understanding the concept of Islamic moderatism.11 The group of 
Muslims who do not react fervently to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
for instance, can be regarded as moderate. Or, in the context of multi-
national occupation in Afghanistan and Iraq, moderate Muslims are 
those who do not oppose this occupation, or even support this 
occupation on the ground of democratization. In short, moderate 
Muslim group comprises those who do not react overwhelmingly to 
the international conflicts involving majority Muslim countries on one 
side, and the West on the other side. 
Despite the fact that the term moderate or moderatism is not easy 
to define, there are common features that characterize the moderate 
mode of religiosity among Indonesian Muslims. Among the five 
features of the moderate Islam as mentioned above, it is non-violent 
ideology that brings all segments of the moderate Muslims within one 
enclave of Islamic moderatism. The other four features are, however, 
essentially contested among them. It is within this stream that NU and 
Muhammadiyah stand as the two exemplary models of Islamic 
moderatism in Indonesia.  
 
 
                                                                
9 Khan, “Islamic Democracy and Moderate Muslims,” p. 40. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Graham E. Fuller, “Freedom and Security: Necessary Conditions for Moderation,” 
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 21-28. 
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Moderate Islam of Muhammadiyah and NU 
In the Indonesian context, the question would be: what and how 
does Islamic moderatism look like? Who are individuals and groups of 
Muslim who can be called moderate; Is it Muhammadiyah, NU, or 
other organizations? It is indeed a simple question but hard to answer, 
particularly when one points to the heterogeneity of religious modes in 
the spectrum of Indonesian Islam. In this case, one cannot deny the 
fact that Indonesian Islam comprises a vast array of ideology, thought, 
as well as practice of Muslim community ranging from one extreme to 
another extreme. 
Before one identifies what, who and how moderate Islam is 
defined in an Indonesian context, a conceptual framework based upon 
which the definition of moderatism is established is needed. It has to 
be acknowledged that a conceptual framework of moderatism in the 
context of Indonesian Islam may take a different shape from that of 
other Muslim world, wherein Islam as majority or minority religion. 
Different context of each country does contribute to the 
distinctiveness of moderatism. Furthermore, the evolution of meaning 
contained in whatever concept within a particular society will depend 
on the development of that society.12 This means that the meaning of 
moderatism may evolve according to the development of social and 
political context of a particular community. It can cover various 
meanings stretching from one pole to the other one within particular 
spectrum of moderatism. 
The moderate group, in general, occupies the middle-ground 
within the spectrum of Islamic thought. But if one examines this issue 
more closely, there are at least the other three layers under this 
spectrum, ranging from radical-moderatism, middle-ground moderat-
ism, to soft-moderatisme. Radical-moderatism can be characterized as 
a salafist-minded ideology, thought or movement which suggests the 
authentic version of religiosity through direct reference to the pristine 
sources of Islam: the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. They tend to reject the mode 
of religiosity that accommodates too much the classical Islamic 
thought.13 They also reject the civilization of the West with its all 
                                                                
12 William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1987). 
13 John Obert Voll, Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1994), p. 111. 
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derivatives such as democracy, human rights, civil society, and the like, 
through peaceful means, and not through violence. 
In the context of identity and ideological boundaries of 
moderatism, Erich Kolig and Greg Fealy, through their respected 
research project maintain that the concept Islamic moderatism does 
not constitute clear-cut and black-and-white boundaries.14 This is 
partly because Islamic moderatism is not supported by an authentic 
and solid theological argument that forms a unified color of moderate 
Islam. Claims of moderatism tend to be based on the absence of 
extremity in responding particular religious issues. The majority of 
moderate Muslims, in my theoretical assumption, have been occupied 
by the so-called “floating mass” which is not supported by a 
complicated theological and philosophical “thick description”.15  
This “floating mass” comprises some group of Muslims that tend 
not to fully care about the basic argument in their religious 
understanding and attitude.16 The reference in their religiosity is merely 
based on sociological factors that can lead to the process of decision 
making commonly undertaken by the majority group. This means that 
the tendency of their religious attitude depends very much on 
pragmatic-sociological considerations, not on a deep and reflective 
theological argumentation or religious narrative. As a result, their 
religious attitude and thinking tend to go along with current streams; 
they are readily to change their religious attitude contingent upon 
religious practices popularly observed in the society. Simply put, such a 
religious manifestation can be considered as banal religious practices 
or—in fiqh terminology is called as—taqli>d, that is, the most common 
layer of Muslims which occupies the lowest stratum of religious 
community. They are characterized by the uncritical consumption of 
whatever produced by religious elites. 
The same case occurs in the discussion of radical and liberal Islam. 
The group of moderate Muslims occupies the middle-ground between 
the two extreme poles that give them more rooms of movement. 
                                                                
14 Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?,” Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 104-121; 
Erich Kolig, “Radical Islam, Islamic Fervour, and Political Sentiments in Central Java, 
Indonesia,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, 4, No. 1 (2005), p. 57. 
15 Masdar Hilmy, “Moderatisme Islam Indonesia,” Kompas, 22 October 2011, p. 6. 
16 In a typically-Indonesian sociological language, this “floating mass” may overlap 
with abangan (nominal) Islam or nationalist Islam. 
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Ideologically speaking, radical Islamist thinking can easily exercise 
influence over, or even further take sympathies from, that “floating 
mass” moderate Muslims. This means that it is the moderate Muslims 
as the closest party that can easily be infected by the ideology and 
thinking of radical Islamism, and not the liberal Muslim group. On the 
contrary, this “floating mass” moderate Muslims cannot easily move to 
the side of liberal pole, because intellectually speaking these liberal 
Muslims are deeply-learned in Islamic sciences, while the “floating 
mass” moderate Muslims are not. It has to be admitted that the bulk 
majority of liberal Muslims comprises the moderate Islam, but not 
from the wing of the above “floating mass”. 
Some of the students of Indonesian Islam studies are consistent in 
arguing that Islam in this country comprises the moderate version of 
Islam.17 This moderate position is represented, for instance, by the 
largest two religious organizations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU)—popularly known as traditionalist—and Muhammadiyah—
popularly known as modernist. The two organizations can be classified 
into moderate Islam due to their non-violent theological standpoint. 
These two organizations, in addition, agree with the idea of Unified 
State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI, Negara Kesatuan Republik 
Indonesia), one of the most latent issues propagated by Muslim hard-
liners in the country. For both of them, the form of Unified State of 
the Republic of Indonesia, with Pancasila as its ideological basis, UUD 
1945 as its constitution basis, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as its slogan, are 
considered to be able to accommodate the substantive elements of 
moderate Islam, the theological vision of which is blessing for all 
universe (rah}matan li al-‘a>lami>n). 
In terms of modern values, both organizations by and large do not 
show resistance to democracy and human rights, two most paramount 
values of modernity.18 Democracy, they argue, is seen not only as the 
universal value that is workable in developed Western countries, but it 
can also be pulled out from the pristine sources of Islam, i.e. the 
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th. In their argument, Islam is, by definition, in line 
                                                                
17 Azyumardi Azra, Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context (Jakarta: 
Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 60-64. 
18 Masykuri Abdillah, Responses of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals to the Concept of Democracy 
(Hamburg: Abera Verlag Meyer & Co. KG, 1997). See also, Robert W. Hefner, Civil 
Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
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with the modern values of democracy and human rights, the two most 
supreme pillars for the existence of humanity and nations.19 Islam is in 
itself democratic and, therefore, no point of refuting this proposition. 
There are a lot of cultural aspects of tradition in Islam which are later 
on subject to change and reform. It is a matter of fact that Islam 
proves to be able to leave its black history of slavery in the past.  
In addition to the acceptance of modern values, Indonesian 
Islam—with particular reference to the above two organizations—has 
received its high-profile image as a home to the tradition of religious 
pluralism and tolerance.20 Genealogically speaking, Indonesian Islam 
has been championing its reputation for being tolerant version of 
Islam since its very first inception in the country. Indonesia itself has a 
long tradition of religious tolerance, far before Islam came to the 
Archipelago and became the majority religion in this country. 
Indonesian Islam has an interconnected link to the tradition of tole-
rance of the Hindu-Buddhist era, in which a great number of Hindu 
and Buddhist temples stood side by side within a particular historic 
site.21 
The question would be, is it the case that all members and 
followers of NU as well as Muhammadiyah can be guaranteed to have 
a moderate ideology as explained above? Following the thinking 
spectrum sketched above, the writer tends to argue that not all 
members and followers of the two organizations have a moderate 
mode of religious thinking. If it is explained in a more detailed, the 
typology of members and followers of the two organizations can be 
sketched into three main clusters as follows: 1) radical-moderate, 2) 
middle-ground-moderate, and 3) soft-moderate.  
The first cluster refers to a group of individuals whose ideological 
and religious vision is puritan in nature. This cluster has a closer 
emotional and ideological link to hard-line ideology. Some of them 
have even metamorphosed ideologically into a hard-line movement 
and have been part of the rank-and-files in such religious movements 
as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), 
                                                                
19 See, for instance, Robin Bush, Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam 
and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), p. 187. 
20 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1995). 
21 M.C. Ricklefs, “Six Centuries of Islamization in Java,” Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), 
Conversion to Islam (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979), pp. 100-128. 
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Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s-led Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and the like. 
Those hard-line groups make the members of NU-Muhammadiyah as 
their prime target in da`wah (propagating) activities. In this context, it is 
not exaggerating that in some parts of East Java, there are some NU 
elites who are identified as the spokesman of HTI.22  
On the other hand, the group of soft-moderatism refers to the 
bulk segment of Muhammadiyah and NU mostly occupied by the 
“floating mass”—or non-devout—Muslims with limited knowledge 
about religion. This second group occupies the lion-share of the two 
organizations. Since their religious understanding and attitude is due to 
sociological-pragmatic factors, they are the most vulnerable to be 
potential recruits of hard-line movement. This is so particularly when 
they meet a particular hard-line cleric (murabbi >) and they get tempted by 
the theological arguments of the murabbi > that usually lead to internal 
conversion among them. It is this kind of theological encounter that 
can explain the phenomenon of internal conversion among 
Muhammadiyah and NU communities from moderate to radical 
ideology. 
The third moderate cluster consists of those who are usually 
deeply-learned in religious sciences and or affiliated to pesantrens. So 
far, they have crucial position among their communities and play a key 
role in the process of social transformation within their respected 
environments. In terms of religious trends, they serve as the makers, 
producers or trendsetters of religiosity for the common people. They 
are mostly Muslim scholars (kyai) or pesantren alumni, both from 
traditional as well as modernist pesantrens, who are deeply-versed in 
classical and modern Islamic sciences. This cluster represents the 
important makers of Islamic moderatism projects in Indonesia who are 
responsible for transforming the religious awareness among millions of 
members and followers of the two organizations.  
Quantitatively speaking, this cluster perhaps represents a small 
number of the segment of moderate Muslims—perhaps far less than 
the two earlier clusters. This cluster nevertheless occupies the most 
important social class within the structure of moderate Muslims in 
                                                                
22 This is based on research findings by Rubaidi, a doctorate student of the 
Postgraduate Program of IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya. See, Rubaidi, “Pergeseran 
Kelas Menengah NU: Studi tentang Pergeseran Ideologi dari Moderat ke Islamisme 
dan Post-Islamisme di Jawa Timur” (Surabaya: IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 2012).  
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Indonesia that is in turn able to inspire millions of followers by means 
of powerful moderate ideas. It is this last cluster that has been much 
expected in mainstreaming and producing a well-established and 
workable blue-print of Indonesia’s Islamic moderatism in the future. 
In addition to the positive record about the acceptance of the two 
mainstream organizations to the NKRI, Pancasila, UUD 1945, 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, as well as modern values, there is another 
characteristic of Islamic moderatism which is commonly accepted in 
the Western perspective but rejected by the two: secularism. Almost 
all—not to say all—Indonesia’s moderate Islam reject the idea of 
secularism on the grounds that it consists typically-Western bounded 
moderatism which is not applicable in the context of Indonesian Islam.  
The rejection of the majority toward secularism, indeed, needs 
robust empirical data which justifies further investigation. As far as 
Indonesian Islam is concerned, secularism is not a familiar term for the 
majority of Indonesian Muslims despite the fact that in practice 
secularism has been an unstated part of their daily life.23 This is simply 
because most of the Indonesian Muslims do not feel comfortable with 
the idea of separation between religion and the state. The classical 
nomenclature of Islamic thinking only acknowledges the doctrine of 
Islam as religion (di>n) and state (dawlah).24 In other words, secularism 
has been perceived by many as an “alien” in the landscape of 
Indonesian Muslims’ thinking and practice.  
The degree of Indonesia’s Islamic moderatism is frequently 
determined by how Muslims approach and understand the sacred texts 
(the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th). Those who rely heavily on context in 
understanding the texts have been referred to as moderate Muslims. 
On the other side, the Muslim group who tend to employ literal 
approach to those texts has been considered as radicals.25 The use of 
                                                                
23 In Abdurrahman Wahid’s formulation, the type of secularism adopted within the 
context of Indonesian Islam is soft or mild secularism. See, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
“Indonesia’s Mild Secularism,” SAIS Review 21, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2001), pp. 25-27.  
24 For further information on doctrine of indivisibility religion from politics in Islam, 
see, among others, Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1996); See also, James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of 
Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); cf. Nazih Ayubi, Political 
Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London & New York: Routledge, 1991). 
25 See, for instance, Firman Noor, “Comparison of the Political Perceptions between 
Radical Islam and Moderate Islam in Indonesia in the Reform Era,” Jurnal Penelitian 
Politik, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2005): pp. 13-33. 
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these two approaches can be seen, for instance, in understanding the 
form of ideal State in Islam. Regarding this issue, the moderate 
Muslims tend to employ modern reference in building their arguments 
on the ideal form of state in Islam. Such methodological reference 
usually leads to the conclusion that Islam does not provide a 
prescriptive and conclusive clue of what an ideal form of the state in 
Islam constitutes. The radicals, however, tend to pull some keywords 
out of the sacred texts in literal sense to be treated as the ideological 
basis for an Islamic state. This can be seen, among others, in the case 
of Caliphate doctrine as propagated by HTI as a translation of the 
word khila>fah in the Qur’a>n.26 
Be that as it may, drawing a firm line between the radical Muslims 
from moderate ones can be theoretically misleading. This is because 
each group does not apply its methodological approach strictly and 
consistently. The most current condition of Indonesian Islam has been 
characterized by the tendency of mutual exchange in methodology 
between the two poles. There are times when the radicals are 
convenient with contextual approach in understanding a particular 
religious doctrine. On the contrary, there are times when the 
moderates feel comfortable with literal approach. This can be seen, for 
instance, from the fact that a great number of radicals are no longer 
bothered with the use of modern technology, whereas their fellow 
moderates can be quite conservative in accepting modern technology.  
In Search for Indonesia’s Islamic Moderatism 
Theological system which is in itself sufficient to support the 
conceptual framework and praxis of religious mode of moderatism 
would be sine qua non within the landscape of Indonesia’s Islamic 
moderatism. It must emanate the country’s public sphere if it wishes to 
provide a moderate vision of Islam. So far the concept of Islamic 
moderatism has been juxtaposed with external modalities such as 
cultural-spiritual heritage of the nation’s predecessors pulled out from 
non-Islamic elements. It is time now that an authentic version of 
Islamic moderatism must be drawn from within the internal sources of 
Islam in order to formulate a blue-pint for Indonesia’s Islamic 
moderatism, that is, an internal modalities-based version of religious 
moderatism. 
                                                                
26 See, for instance, Hilmy, Islamism and democracy in Indonesia, pp. 160-63. 
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Nuhammadiyah and NU must be acknowledged as religious 
organizations that pioneered the making of moderate mode of 
religiosity regardless the complexity to put this mode into practice. The 
formulation of such a blue-print is inspired directly by normative 
values in Islam on the one side. This formulation, however, suffers 
from the lack of “thick theological description” which guides the 
pattern of Islamic moderatism in a more thoughtful but practical 
manner. In spite of this shortcoming, this formulation can be seen as a 
“local genius” of actualization of religious doctrines which may not be 
found in any part of the Muslim world. In a more or less similar 
formation, Malaysia has the formulation of “Hadhari Islam”, a nomen-
clature of Islamic thinking specifically designed to accommodate an 
ideological battle between the dimension of al-as}a>lah (authenticity) and 
the dimension of al-h}ad}a>rah (modern contemporary civilization) in 
religion.27  
Almost similar to the formulation of Hadhari Islam in Malaysia, 
this country has also witnessed a religious articulation called “masyara-
kat madani” (simply translated as civil society).28 The interesting thing 
about “masyarakat madani” is that although the term does not carry 
religious connotation, its connotation has been much religious because 
it is directly inspired by normative Islam. Initiated by a group of 
modernist Muslim intellectuals-scholars in early 1990s, “masyarakat 
madani” has become a nomenclature of Islamic politics praised by 
many to represent the model of Indonesia’s Islamic civility. ”Masya-
rakat madani” represents an overwhelming sprout of Muslim middle-
class on the stage of national politics, where they had been 
marginalized by the state in the Old Order and early New Order era. 
More importantly, “masyarakat madani” represents the version of 
moderate Islam that combines dimension of modernity and dimension 
of primordial religious identity. 
Viewed from its long historical journey since the acceptance of 
Pancasila as the only ideological foundation of the state in the 1984 
Situbondo Congress—lately popularly known as The Return to the 
1926 Khittah—NU has shown the pendulum movement of its 
                                                                
27 Terence Chong, “The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari,” in Saw Swee-Hock & K. 
Kesavapany (eds), Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 26-46. 
28 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Masyarakat Madani: Agama, Kelas Menengah, dan Perubahan Sosial 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1999). 
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religiosity into the middle-ground moderatism. The historical journey 
of Nahdliyin (the followers of NU) has shown a fairly extreme degree 
of intensity and ups-and-downs as well as diverse internal dynamic. In 
its latest development, NU has even received ideological challenges 
from hard-liner Muslims to question the normative foundation of 
Islamic moderatism.  
In order to support the foundation of Islamic moderatism, some 
outstanding NU founding scholars (kyais)—such as KH. Achmad 
Siddiq, KH. Ali Maksum, KH. As’ad Syamsul Arifin and others—have 
formulated a road-map to the doctrine of Islamic moderatism which is 
called as the theology of ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama>’ah (frequently 
abbreviated as Aswaja).29 The literal meaning of aswaja is the holder of 
the Prophet’s pathway and communion which is a kind of code of 
piety shown by the Prophet, his Companions and pious predecessors 
(al-salaf al-s }a>lih}) expected to guarantee the purest form of religion.30 
The theological construct of NU’s moderatism is bolstered by the 
doctrinal “trilogy” as follows: al-tawassut} (moderation or middle-
ground), i‘tida>l (straight-path, neither left nor right leaning), and al-
tawa>zun (equilibrium, fairness in treating the worldly affairs and the 
hereafter).31 The concept of al-tawassut} is derived from a verse of the 
Qur’a>n (2: 143), i‘tida>l is from, 5: 8), and al-tawa >zun is from QS al-
H {adi>d: 25. The manifestation of the thee principles and characteristics 
mentioned above, according to some NU kyais, must be explicitly 
exposed in all key aspects of Islam such as faith (`aqi>dah), Islamic law 
(shari >‘ah), tas }awwuf (Sufi) and akhla>q (social ethics), mu’a>s }arah (social 
conduct), in the field of nation-state, culture and civilization, Islamic 
propagation (da`wah), and some other sectors.32  
As a modality, the formulation of Aswaja serves only as an embryo 
for the making of the blue-print, and not the blue-print itself. It is not 
an ideal formulation that accommodates all new tendencies in far more 
                                                                
29 Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana Keagamaan di Kalangan 
Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 
p. 263. 
30 KH. Achmad Siddiq, Khittah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: Khalista in collaboration with 
LTN-NU Jawa Timur, 2006), p. 27.  
31 KH. Abdul Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah & Ajaran (Refleksi 65 Th. 
Ikut NU) (Surabaya: Khalista, 2007), pp. 69-71. 
32 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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complex and challenging religious life. In accompaniment of the 
religious formulation of NU and pesantren is the use of some other 
methodological apparatus to approach Islam through the two pristine 
sources: the Qur’a>n and H {adi>th. The methodological approach 
comprises us}ul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and other metho-
dological apparatus such as mas}lahah (public good), istih}san (utility), 
istih}sab (recommended norms), qawl s }ah}a>bi> (legal opinions of the 
Prophet’s Companions), shadd al-dhara>’i‘ (closing the direction to sins), 
and so forth.33 
The use of the above methodological apparatus in the stream of 
religious thought in NU circles can be analogized as a double-edged 
sword. On the one side it tends to eternalize religious orthodoxy as a 
result of indirect referencing system towards the Qur’a >n and H {adi>th. 
Such an indirect referencing system, however, can generate the room 
of experimentation and articulation of thinking that can, in turn, lead 
to the making of creativeness and freedom of thinking by utilizing the 
methodological apparatus particularly during the Islamic law making 
process (istinba>t}). It has to be admitted that the intellectual tradition of 
NU is created due to the habitual rehearsals of these intellectual 
exercises in responding and solving some contemporary issues. This, in 
turn, leads to the making of intellectual tradition among the younger 
generation of NU that produce groundbreaking approaches that enrich 
the old paradigm in the horizon of intellectual methodology among the 
older generation of NU. The tendency of progressive, or even liberal, 
intellectual tradition among the younger Nahdliyin (the followers of 
NU) represents the functioning of the methodological apparatus in the 
dialectics of contemporary Islamic thought in Indonesia.34 
                                                                
33 There is an intellectual tradition of NU in approaching and solving contemporary 
issues called Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il, in which three methodological approaches used by 
the kyais in the new law making process: 1) qawli> (result) approach; 2) ilh}a>qi> (analogy) 
approach, and; 3) manha>ji> (methodology) approach. For further information about this, 
see, Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), p. 170. 
34 Laode Ida, NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekuler Baru (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 
2004); See also, Shonhadji Sholeh, Arus Baru NU: Perubahan Pemikiran Kaum Muda NU 
dari Tradisionalisme ke Post-tradisionalisme (Surabaya: JP Books, 2004). See also, Hairus 
Salim H.S. and Muhammad Ridwan (ed.), Kultur Hibrida: Anak Muda NU di Jalur 
Kultural (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999). 
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On the other side, the appreciation towards the use of 
methodological apparatus and the tradition of Islamic thinking as 
much developed by the younger generation of NU have received less 
attention among the followers and members of Muhammadiyah, due 
to the deep institutionalization of the slogan ”the return to the Qur’a >n 
and H {adi >th” (al-ruju>’ ila> al-Qur’a>n wa al-H {adi>th).35 This does not 
necessarily mean that the younger generation of Muhammadiyah do 
not arise the same awareness as that of the younger generation of NU 
in revitalizing the spirit of revivalism (tajdi>d). In responding to the 
stagnation of reform movement, some concerned younger generation 
of the Muhammadiyah founded a similar association as NU younger 
generation’s Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network), called 
Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, abbreviated as JIMM, 
(Network of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals). Founded by some 
progressive young generation of Muhammadiyah such as Zuly Qadir, 
Abd Rahim Ghozali, Hilman Latief, and others on 9 October 2003, 
JIMM wishes to bring the revivalist spirit back home to 
Muhammadiyah.36  
Interestingly, in the context of Indonesian Islam, the use of 
methodological apparatus in the process of reform actually had been 
introduced for the first time by Muhammadiyah, not NU.37 The 
founding of Muhammadyah was inspired by the misery of some 
Muslim elites in response to the backwardness of the Muslim 
community as a whole. It is this misery that in turn inspired the 
embryo of the reform movement of Islamic thought (tajdi>d and ijtiha>d), 
where in NU circle it had been considered closed since the third 
Hijriyah century.38 Without the pioneering movement undertaken by 
Muhammadiyah, it is impossible to see the moderate face of Islam as 
can be seen today. Thanks to this organization, the idea of reform has 
become a familiar vocabulary for Indonesian Muslims. Due to its real 
                                                                
35 Moenawar Chalil, Kembali kepada Al-Qur’an dan as-Sunnah (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 
1956).  
36 Suaidi Asyari, Nalar Politik NU & Muhammadiyah: Over Crossing Java Sentris 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS in collaboration with Center for the Study of Contemporary 
Indonesian Islam and Society, 2009), p. 262. 
37 Ahmad Jainuri, Ideologi Kaum Reformis: Melacak Pandangan Keagamaan Muhammadiyah 
Periode Awal (Surabaya: Lembaga Pengkajian Agama dan Masyarakat [LPAM], 2002), p. 
105. 
38 Ibid., p. 107. 
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contribution, it is not exaggerating that Muhammadiyah was attributed 
as a modernist organization in the country.39 
The attribution of Muhammadiyah as a modernist organization is 
due to its positive vision toward modernity. Through its methodolo-
gical apparatus, i.e. tajdi>d, Muhammadiyah started to launch a series of 
reform movement within the body of Indonesian Islam. Despite 
strong resistence from the traditionalist Muslims, the Muhammadiyah’s 
reform has been at the point of no return, and later proved to appeal 
the sympathy and membership from the traditionalist Muslims. One of 
the examples of the Muhammadiyah reform movement that was 
rejected by the traditionalists but now becomes commonplace is the 
change of sermon language of Friday prayers and two Ied prayers from 
Arabic—as had been commonplace among traditionalists—into local 
and national languages.40  
In addition to functioning as a stepping stone for reform move-
ment, the slogan “the return to the Qur’a>n and H{adi >th,” however, may 
function as a factor that causes stagnation for Muhammadiyah reform 
movement.41 Like a double-edged sword, this slogan has played two 
roles at once. On the one side, this slogan has played its function well 
as the pioneer of reform movement in Indonesia. But when the 
reformed version of Islam has been instituted, this slogan can lead to 
the establishment of religious orthodoxy and make Muhammadiyah 
puritan in nature.42 This is one of the most salient characteristics of 
epistemological traps derived from the slogan “the return to the 
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th.” The stagnation of reform has been the critical 
issue directed to Muhammadiyah, especially when its younger 
generation unified in JIMM who wish to reinvigorate the spirit of tajdi >d 
                                                                
39 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942 (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1973). 
40 W. Sairin, Gerakan Pembaruan Muhammdiyah (Jakarta: Pustaka sinar Harapan, 1995). 
See also, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Kiai Ahmad Dahlan: Jejak Pembaruan Sosial dan 
Kemaanusiaan, Kado Satu Abad (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), p. 236. 
41 Suaidi Asy’ari, “A Real Threat from Within: Muhammadiyah’s Identity 
Metamorphosis and the Dilemma of Democracy,” Journal of Indonesian Islam, Vol. 01, 
No. 01 (June 2007): pp. 18-41. 
42 This reminds us to what Peacock has found out in his book that Muhammadiyah 
constitutes a puritanical Muslim organization. See, James L. Peacock, Muslim Puritans: 
Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asian Islam (Berkeley and California: University of 
California Press, 1978). 
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has been resisted and marginalized by the older generation of this 
reformist organization.43  
In contrast to what Muhammadiyah has undergone, the 
employment of methodological apparatus among the young Nahdliyyin 
does not give credits to NU as a reformist or modernist organization, 
albeit some epistemological leap in the use of methodological means 
among the young Nahdliyyin thanking to their mobilization in tertiary 
formal education. Furthermore, NU’s traditional identity is caused by 
the overwhelming appreciation toward the horizon of classical thought 
of Muslim scholars as contained in yellow books (kitab kuning) of the 
pesantren.44 It is due to this reason that the Nahdliyyin have been 
criticized as being traditional in the way they approach and understand 
Islam and the world.  
Regardless its association to the traditional stigmatization, the 
overwhelming reliance on the use of classical Muslim scholars’ horizon 
can serve as a stepping stone toward the epistemological leap in 
Islamic thinking methodology. This is because everything sometimes 
can function in two contradictory ways; on the one hand it can 
function in a negative way, on the other hand it can function as a 
positive and productive way. On the one hand it can lead to regression 
buton the other hand it can be the modality toward the progression. 
This is the analogy of double-edged sword function in explaining both 
the progressive movement and the regressive one within 
Muhammadiyah and NU. In relation to the Nahdliyyin’s appreciation to 
tradition of classical Islamic thought, their reliance on such a classical 
tradition can mean a lot to the making of renewal and reform 
movement among the young Nahdliyyin.45 
Apart from what the above two moderate organizations have 
achieved, the search for Islamic moderatism in Indonesia needs a more 
expansive, deeper and more thorough perspective on moderatism 
                                                                
43 This resistance has resulted in, among others, the victimization of young progressive 
thinkers, such as Muhammad Shofan, who had been fired as a lecturer from 
Muhammadiyah University of Gresik, East Java. 
44 Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, pesantren, dan tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di 
Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1995); See also, Idem, “Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic 
Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146 
(1990), pp. 226-269. 
45 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), p. 25. 
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which is derived from internal values of classical Islam. It has to be 
admitted that the concept of Islamic moderatism has not been 
developed from a strong and detailed theological basis. The concept of 
Islamic moderatism relies heavily on external aspects of Indonesian 
culture and society. The externality has dominated the theological 
construct of Islamic moderatism in Indonesia. The immediate 
impression from Islamic moderatism in Indonesia, however, is that, it 
is Indonesian [culture] factor, and not Islam one, that contributes to 
the making of Islamic moderatism. The fact is that Indonesia has 
enjoyed its reputation for its abundant tradition of tolerance, respect 
and harmony. In this context, Islam has come into such an established 
web of tradition as an outsider that flourishes the local tradition of 
tolerance.  
The attempts at formulating the concept of Islamic moderatism in 
the end are determined by the way Muslims approach and understand 
the Qur’a>n and H {adi>th. The return to both sources is epistemologically 
problematic and deserves due consideration if Muslims wish to achieve 
an authentic concept of Islamic moderatism. Nevertheless, there are 
times when Muslims do not have many choices except returning back 
to the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th as an ethical basis in developing a more 
workable concept of Islamic moderatism. It is noteworthy that both 
radical and moderate Muslims equally treat both of them in a supreme 
position as the normative basis for developing an appropriate code of 
conduct. The term “normative basis,” however, can mean differently 
for each of them; starting from the direct reference in literal sense to 
merely as a source of inspiration. In terms of ethics, there are a lot of 
things that need a direct referencing to both sources and, therefore, 
can be accepted as they are; but there are other things that need to be 
taken in spirit, not in literal sense. It is within this context that the 
degree of Islamic moderatism will be at stake.  
From the above explanation, it can be said that the concept of 
Islamic moderatism in Indonesia has been developed centripetally. 
Now, it is the time that the concept must be developed centrifugally in 
order to maximize the internal sources of Islam as the first reference in 
producing a blue-print of Islamic moderatism. If the first mode relies 
on the flexibility of Islam as an outsider to adapt itself to the local 
condition of the country, the second mode relies on Islam as internal 
modality to develop a more established blue-print of Islamic 
moderatism in order to draw its relevance to local condition of 
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Indonesia. It is within this context that what Fazlur Rahman has called 
as “double-movement” approach is worth referencing through back-
and-forth consultation in terms of reconciling between modernity and 
traditionalism in the spectrum of Islamic thought.46  
Conclusion 
To sum up, Indonesian Islam has a high-profile of moderatism 
through Muhammadiyah and NU, the two exemplary models of 
moderatism. The moderate theology of both organizations, however, is 
no longer sufficient in accommodating the changes and challenges of 
this modern era. As this article has explained, there are a lot of ways to 
achieve a more detailed but workable blue-print of Indonesia’s Islamic 
moderatism. It is the time for Indonesian Muslims to prove the world 
that they have an authentic version of Islamic moderatism which is 
internally driven. They have to prove that the concept of Islamic 
moderatism is not a myth, but a down-to-earth reality. In this context, 
the phenomenon of “internal conversion” occurred among the 
followers of moderate Islam into radical Islam must be understood as a 
serious “strike” for the moderate Muslims who are not aware of 
formulating a more established but workable blue-print of Islamic 
moderatism. What Muhammadiyah and NU have done so far is a 
pioneering attempt at the making of Islamic moderatism in Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, their formulation of moderatism is due to the internal 
demand of Muslims to create a theological system that fits in with the 
local condition of Indonesia. 
For Muhammadiyah, it is imperative that the followers and or 
members of this organization must revive the spirit of reform (tajdi>d) 
as its branding image since the beginning in order to formulate a 
theologically more firmed basis for Islamic moderatism. It must be 
acknowledged that this organization has done a lot for initiating the 
mode of Islamic moderatism though a series of reform movement in 
early 1920s. But the overwhelming reliance on the slogan of the return 
to the Qur’a>n and H{adi>th can kill the inner capacity of this 
organization to develop a more sustainable project on Islamic 
moderatism from within.  
For NU, likewise, the formulation of such key-terms as tawassut}, 
tawa>zun, i’tida>l and tasa>muh} has to be appreciated as an initial stage in 
                                                                
46 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1984), p. 7. 
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developing a more established blue-print of Islamic moderatism. This 
formulation, however, is perceived by some radical Muslims as a 
“neither-nor” formulation which stands in no-where position within 
the spectrum of Islamic thought. Some even consider that formulation 
as less or downgraded version of Islam and, therefore, needs further 
elaboration and “objectivication” at practical level. In short, the 
moderation principle developed by NU tends to create less committed 
character in religiosity. This formulation is likewise not sufficient if NU 
wishes to contribute to the betterment of the nation. The good 
principle of moderation should reflect a rigorous commitment to 
upholding the normative values of Islam without necessarily losing the 
very characteristic of its civility. 
The Islamic moderatism project, above all, should start “from 
within.” It is a matter of fact that such common denominators as 
Pancasila, UUD 1945, NKRI, and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—better known 
as four pillars—are cultural emblems that convey the message of 
moderation. These cultural emblems, however, have been developed 
“from without” that lack a sense of being authentic in terms of 
religious identity. On the contrary, the formulation of Islamic 
moderatism “from within” will guarantee the sense of authenticity 
among the Muslim community. By doing so, the foundation of Islamic 
moderatism in Indonesia will engender a more sustainable Islamic 
moderatism since it stands on a firm theological ground. [] 
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